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A security analysis of a recently proposed secure communication scheme based on the phase
synchronization of chaotic systems is presented. It is shown that the system parameters directly
determine the cipher text waveform, hence it can be readily broken by system parameter estimation
from the cipher text signal. © 2004 American Institute of Physics. @DOI: 10.1063/1.1688092#Most secure chaotic communication systems are based on
complete synchronization, whereas a new cryptosystem
has been proposed based on phase synchronization. This
scheme hides binary messages in the instantaneous phase
of the drive subsystem used as the transmitting signal to
drive the response subsystem. Although it is claimed to be
secure against some traditional attacks in the chaotic
cryptosystems literature, including the parameter estima-
tion attack, we show that it is breakable by this attack. As
a conclusion, the system is not secure and should not be
used for communications where security is a strict re-
quirement.
I. INTRODUCTION
The possibility of synchronization of two coupled cha-
otic systems was first shown by Pecora and Carroll.1–3 The
importance of this discovery was quickly appreciated,4 and
soon this topic aroused great interest as a potential means for
communications.5–10 In recent years, a great effort has been
devoted to extend the chaotic communication applications to
the field of secure communications. Accordingly, a great
number of cryptosystems based on chaos have been
proposed;11–16 some of them fundamentally flawed by a lack
of robustness and security.17–28 All of them were based on
complete synchronization of chaotic systems ~CS!. In Ref.
29, a new secure communication scheme based on the phase
synchronization ~PS! of a chaotic system is proposed.
PS of coupled chaotic oscillators with weak and strong
coupling has been investigated extensively.30–34 In PS, as
opposed to CS, only the phases of the subsystems are locked
and there is little correlation in signal amplitudes. In general,
if the phase difference of two chaotic oscillators is bounded,
the oscillators can be considered as phase synchronized.31
In this new scheme the drive and the response sub-
systems are strongly coupled, using the phase information as
the transmitted cipher text. The plain text binary message b
is hidden in the instantaneous phase of the drive subsystem.
At the response subsystem, the phase difference is detected
and its strong fluctuation above or below zero allows the
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The secure communication process is illustrated by
means of an example based on coupled Ro¨ssler chaotic os-
cillators. In the example, the drive subsystem is formed by
two weak coupled oscillators. The plain text is used to modu-
late the same parameter in both oscillators 1 and 2. The
equations of the drive subsystem are
x˙1,252~v1Dv!y1,22z1,21«~x2,12x1,2!,
y˙1,25~v1Dv!x1,21ay1,2 , ~1!
z˙1,250.21z1,2~x1,2210!.
The response subsystem is governed by
x˙352v8y32z31h~~x3
21y3
2!1/2 cos fm2x3!,
y˙35v8x31a8y3 , ~2!
z˙350.21z3~x3210!.
In the example, the parameter values are: v5v851, «
5531023, h55.3, and a5a850.15.
The parameter v corresponds to the natural frequency of
the Ro¨ssler oscillator drive subsystems 1 and 2. The param-
eter v8 corresponds to the natural frequency of the Ro¨ssler
oscillator driven subsystem 3, « corresponds to the weak
coupling factor between the oscillators 1 and 2, and h corre-
sponds to the strong coupling factor in the driven oscillator
3.
The parameter mismatch Dv is modulated by the plain
text, being Dv50.01 if the bit to be transmitted is ‘‘1’’ and
Dv520.01 if the bit to be transmitted is ‘‘0.’’
The cipher text consists of the phase of the mean field of
the two drive oscillators:
fm5arctan
x11x2
y11y2
. ~3!
At the receiving end the phase of the response subsystem
is
f35arctan
x3
y3
.© 2004 American Institute of Physics
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is related to different time delays between the drive and the
response phases.
As the phase is a signal that has an unbounded ampli-
tude, it cannot be transmitted through physical channels. The
authors overcome this problem by coding the signal from p
to 2p , which corresponds to the Poincare´ surface of the
attractor at y1,250. As a consequence, the transmitted cipher
text, marked as fm* , is a sawtooth-like signal with a fre-
quency equal to the observed revolution frequency of the
drive Ro¨ssler oscillators V. The phase at the receiving end is
also coded from p to 2p as f3* .
The plain text is retrieved by calculating the difference
between the cipher text and the reconstructed signal, fm*
2f3* . The difference signal consist of positive and negative
peaks that correspond to the ones and zeros of the plain text.
The example of Ref. 29 is illustrated in Fig. 1. It was
simulated with a four order Runge–Kutta integration algo-
rithm in MATLAB 6, with a step size of 0.001. In order to
recover the plain text with the exact waveform, allowing for
a small time delay, a Smith-trigger was included as a recon-
struction filter, with switch on point at 4 and switch off point
at 24.
Given that in the example of Ref. 29 there is no indica-
tion about the parameter initial values, our simulation is
implemented with the following initial values:
(x1(0) ,x2(0) ,x3(0) ,y1(0) ,y2(0) ,y3(0) ,z1(0) ,z2(0) ,z3(0)) 5 (25,23,21,
0,0,0,0,0,0).
The authors seem to base the security of its secure com-
munication system on the properties of the phase synchroni-
zation. They claim that it cannot be broken by some tradi-
tional attacks used against secure chaotic systems with
complete synchronization, but no general analysis of security
is included.
FIG. 1. Plain text recovery with the authorized receiver. Time histories of:
~a! plain text b; ~b! cipher text fm* ; ~c! reconstructed phase signal of the
response subsystem f3* ; ~e! difference between the cipher text and the
reconstructed signal fm*2f3* ; ~f! reconstructed plain text b8.wnloaded 11 Mar 2010 to 161.111.180.191. Redistribution subject to AAlthough the authors point out that the system param-
eters play the role of secret key in transmission ~Ref. 29, Sec.
V!, it is not clearly specified which parameters are consid-
ered as candidates to form part of the key, what the allowable
value range of those parameters is, what the key space is
~how many different keys exist in the system! and how they
should be managed. None of these elements should be ne-
glected when describing a secure communication system.
Most papers on chaotic secure communications are pub-
lished in physics journals and conferences, but not within the
cryptography community; this explains why up to date little
or no critical analysis has been made about the design pro-
cess of these cryptosystems nor to the way the results are
presented. Quoting Bao:35 ‘‘The common annoying feature
of the cryptosystems based on some mathematical models,
e.g., those based on chaos systems, is that only the principle
is given. They lack details, such as recommended key sizes
and key generation steps, etc. Therefore it is not possible for
others to implement the ciphers.’’
The weaknesses of this system and the method to break
it are discussed in the next section.
II. BREAKING THE SYSTEM
The main problem with this cryptosystem lies on the fact
that the cipher text is an analog signal, whose waveform
depends on the system parameter values. Likewise, the dif-
ference between the cipher text and the phase signal of a
nonsynchronized receiver fm*2f3* , depends on these same
parameters. The study of these signals provides the necessary
information to recover a good estimation of the system pa-
rameter values and the correct plain text, as will be seen
next.
When cryptanalyzing a cryptosystem, the general as-
sumption made is that the cryptanalyst knows exactly the
design and working of the cryptosystem under study, i.e., he
knows everything about the cryptosystem except the secret
key. This is an evident requirement in today’s secure com-
munications systems, usually referred to as Kerchoff’s
principle.36 In our attack, total knowledge of the communi-
cations system design is assumed. It is assumed too that the
key consists of the oscillator’s parameters a and v, as they
are the only unknowns in the example of Ref. 29. The key
and the chaotic region which constitutes the key space from
which valid keys are to be chosen should have been thor-
oughly specified in Ref. 29.
In our attack, the search space of the parameter a , that
governs the topology of the chaotic attractor, is restricted to
the unique suitable value range for operation. This range is
characterized by the phase coherent chaotic region of the
Ro¨ssler oscillator. Within this range, its phase increases
monotonically with time, showing a chaotic increase rate,
that allows hiding the binary information.
The operation of the system with values of a greater
than a critical value ac should be avoided because the
Ro¨ssler oscillator becomes a ‘‘wild’’ funnel chaotic attractor,
in which the phase is ill-defined. The value of ac depends on
the Ro¨ssler oscillator natural frequency v (ac’0.186 for v
50.98 and ac’0.195 for v51.02).34 In such a case, theIP license or copyright; see http://chaos.aip.org/chaos/copyright.jsp
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Dophase definition of Eq. ~3! employed by the authors is no
longer applicable,32 rendering it impossible the correct data
retrieving by the authorized receiver.
Values of a,0.04 should also be avoided because the
oscillator exhibits a periodic motion with constant frequency,
the waveform of the oscillator is uniform, and its phase in-
creases linearly with time ~Ref. 33, Sec. 3.1.1!. Therefore,
the instantaneous phase fluctuations, due to the binary infor-
mation modulation, cannot be effectively hidden, and thus
the information could be easily retrieved from the signal.
Such kind of keys, that allow for immediate recovering of
the plain text, are known in cryptography as weak keys.
In the example given in Ref. 29, with v51, the coherent
chaotic region is roughly characterized by the following val-
ues of a:
0.04<a<0.19. ~4!
The behavior of the attractor with respect to a is illus-
trated in Fig. 2, in which the time history of the cipher text
signal fm* for three values of a is shown. The first sample
corresponds to a50.01, showing that the phase increases
linearly. The second one corresponds to a50.15, showing
that the phase increases monotonically with chaotic behavior.
The last sample corresponds to a50.25, showing that the
phase increases and decreases irregularly.
The sensitivity to the parameter values is so low that the
original plain text can be recovered from the cipher text us-
ing an intruder receiver system with parameter values con-
siderably different from the ones used by the transmitter. In
Ref. 29 ~Fig. 7!, it is shown that for $a8,v8%5$0.15,1.00%
the allowable parameter mismatch of a8 is 10.022,
20.028; and the allowable parameter mismatch of v8 is
10.009,20.004.
We have found experimentally that for values of a
P@0,0.19# the plain text b8 can be recovered even when a8
has an absolute error of 60.02, what is in accordance with
Ref. 29, Fig. 7. As a consequence, it is sufficient to try five
values of a8, to cover the whole coherent region. The best
set of values is: a85$0.01,0.05,0.09,0.13,0.17%. In cryptog-
raphy, when breaking a cryptosystem trying all possible keys
~what it is called brute force analysis! the weak keys are
routinely checked. Hence, we have also included in the
search space the value a850.01, that corresponds to the pe-
riodic motion region.
In Fig. 3 the power spectral analysis of the cipher text
signal is shown. As is well known, the frequency of the
FIG. 2. Cipher text phase signal fm* as function of a: ~a! a50.01, the phase
increases almost linearly; ~b! a50.15, the phase increases monotonically
with chaotic behavior; ~c! a50.25, the phase increases and decreases ir-
regularly.wnloaded 11 Mar 2010 to 161.111.180.191. Redistribution subject to ARo¨ssler oscillator is totally evident. The spectrum’s highest
peak appears at V.1.03, close to the parameter value of the
drive subsystem v51. Thus, by simply examining the cipher
text, the second key element v8 is guessed with reasonable
accuracy.
Note that the original motivation for using chaotic
modulation to implement secure communications is that cha-
otic signals exhibit a noise-like, continuous, random and
broad spectrum, that may appear like a fortuitous channel
perturbation, helping for the concealment of valuable infor-
mation and preventing to attract the attention of a casual
observer. In contrast, the proposed system shows a spectrum
with a very specific periodic pattern and a definite waveform
that will attract an eavesdropper’s attention.
Let v8 be the approximate value of v. Once it is mea-
sured we can use it to recover the plain text in the following
way.
First, we introduce the estimated value of v8 into an
intruder receiver with h50, that is, without coupling, so the
intruder receiver oscillator will be running freely. To check
whether the estimation of v8 is good, we look at the output
of the phase comparator fm*2f3* as well as at the cipher text
signal fm* , and at the phase signal of the receiver f3* .
When the frequencies of the transmitter and intruder re-
ceiver are slightly different, then fm*2f3* will look like a
train of pulses of increasing width summed with a direct
current of increasing level, being the final width and direct
current increasing level rate proportional to the difference of
frequencies v82v . Also, the mismatch of the periods of the
phase signals fm* and f3* is perceptible. With this informa-
tion we can adjust the value of v8 in a few steps, until the
width of the pulses tends to zero. Then, the period mismatch
of the phase signals fm* and f3* is unnoticeable and its direct
current level equals zero.
The procedure is illustrated in Fig. 4. We begin with
v851.03, the value estimated from the spectrum, and we see
that the correct value of v8 must be slightly lower, thus we
try v851.015 and we see that we are near the exact value
but still a little bit higher. Next, we try v851.005, and we
see that the frequency match is quite good. This last value of
v8 is retained as the definite one.
Next, we set h55.3 at the intruder receiver and look at
the retrieved data b8 for the previously obtained v8 and for
each of the five possible values of a8. In Fig. 5 the retrieved
binary data b8 obtained with v851.005 and a8
5$0.01,0.05,0.09,0.13,0.17% are presented. It can be seen
that for a85$0.01,0.05,0.09,0.13% only zero value data are
obtained. For a850.17, some output data are present, thus
we assume that the value of a850.17 can be retained as the
FIG. 3. Power spectral analysis of the cipher text signal. The highest peak
corresponds to the frequency of V and lies at V’1.1.IP license or copyright; see http://chaos.aip.org/chaos/copyright.jsp
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obtained with it consists of the correct recovered plain text,
as can be verified from the figure.
Although the estimated pair of values $v8,a8%
5$1.005,0.17% are not exactly the right ones, the plain text is
correctly recovered as a consequence of the system’s low
sensitivity to parameters. Therefore, the claim by the authors
FIG. 4. Determination of the best value of v8: ~a! cipher text signal with
frequency v51.00; ~b! phase signal of the free running intruder receiver
f3* for v851.03; ~c! output of the phase comparator fm*2f3* for v8
51.03; ~d! phase signal of the free running intruder receiver f3* for v8
51.015; ~e! output of the phase comparator fm*2f3* for v851.015; ~f!
phase signal of the free running intruder receiver f3* for v851.005; ~g!
output of the phase comparator fm*2f3* for v851.005.
FIG. 5. Determination of the best value of a8, with v851.005: ~a! original
plain text, b; ~b! output of the phase comparator fm*2f3* for a8
5$0.01,0.05,0.09,0.13%, which is the same in three cases; ~c! output of the
phase comparator fm*2f3* for a850.17; ~d! recovered plain text b8 for
a850.17.wnloaded 11 Mar 2010 to 161.111.180.191. Redistribution subject to Aof Ref. 29 that the scheme is difficult to be broken by tradi-
tional attacks, as the parameter identification method, is un-
founded.
Moreover, we have observed that many other combina-
tions of parameter values allow for the recovery of the cor-
rect plain text as well. In Fig. 6 it is shown, after many
simulations, the region of $v8,a8% values in which correct
plain text recovery of a cipher text generated with a drive
subsystem with $v ,a%5$1.00,0.15% is achieved.
III. CONCLUSION
The proposed cryptosystem is rather weak, since it can
be broken by measuring the power spectrum of the cipher
text signal and trying a small set of parameter values. There
is no detailed description about what the key is, nor what the
key space is, a fundamental aspect in every secure commu-
nication system. The lack of security discourages the use of
this algorithm for secure applications.
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